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Introduction
On August 13th 1961, more or less random historical circumstances led to the building of the Berlin Wall, dividing Germany for four decades into two separate countries. Five decades after this historic event and two decades after the other even more unexpected historic break, German uni…ciation, the question is not only whether the period of division has e¤ects lasting to the present but also whether it is possible to identify why it has long-term e¤ects. Today, the …rst part of this question is a stylized fact: According to Boltho et al. (1997) , East German GDP per capita amounted to 120 percent of West German GDP per capita before 1936. It fell back to 60 percent between 1948 and the peaceful revolution of 1989. The share dropped to its post-war all-time low of 31 percent in 1991. After a steady rise following uni…cation, it stagnates at a level of roughly 65 percent since the second half of the 1990s. Less "hard data" based series on happiness or life satisfaction show very similar patterns (Frijters et al. 2004a (Frijters et al. , 2004b . A seminal study combining life satisfaction and economic conditions in the context of German uni…cation is Easterlin and Plagnol (2008) .
Yet, to explain the hitherto realized result of limited convergence is an open issue. Potential channels include institutions, culture, knowledge and technology, and movements between multiple equilibria. For a general overview of channels of path dependency see Putnam (1993) and Nunn (2009) . 1 In this study, we make an attempt to empirically identify long-term cultural discrepancies in economically relevant notions resulting from the division of Germany and to assess their explanatory potential for limited social convergence. The latter is done by giving the generational passing of cultural traits model by Tabellini (2008a) a new dimension by extending it to a two societies convergence scenario.
1 Putnam (1993) sees three main routes of explanation for the prevailing North-South dichotomy in modern Italy: institutional design, socioeconomic determinants, and sociocultural factors. Empirically, he rules out the …rst two channels and …nds di¤erences in "social capital" at the heart of the economic and political gap: The nothern way of life installed since about 1,000 AD nurtured a system of cooperation and trust that grew into strong civic-mindedness. In contrast, the oppressive nature of Norman rule and the catholic church kept citizens of the South in a state of dependence which led to a widespread social feeling of distrust.
Our study contributes to a recently established strand of mostly empirical literature (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007 , Brosig-Koch et al. 2011 , Buch and Toubal 2009 , Burchardi and Hassan 2011 , Burda 2006 , Fuchs-Schündeln and Izem 2012 , Redding and Sturm 2008 , Süssmuth et al. 2010 , Uhlig 2006 2 that addresses the long-lasting e¤ects of Communism on economically relevant notions twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet system. More than two decades after the fall of the wall it is now possible to study economic behavior of individuals who spent most of their childhood in uni…ed Germany.
We focus on the persistence of gaps in "deep parameters" (i.e. factors relevant for social capital formation) that has recently gained increasing attention in the literature (BrosigKoch et al. 2011, Burchardi and Hassan 2011) . Our empirical strategy widely follows Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) who analyze individuals' policy preferences such as attitudes towards income redistribution or pro-state provision of services that could as well be provided by private forces. In the context of German uni…cation, Rainer and Siedler (2009) is the …rst study to investigate trust which has been shown to impact on a variety of economic outcomes (Knack and Keefer 1997 , Alesina and La Ferrara 2002 , Slemrod and Katuscak 2005 . Their …ndings suggest that some ten years after uni…ca-tion, East Germans still have the same levels of social distrust as shortly after the fall of the wall. However, Rainer and Siedler (2009) is a cross-sectional study, implying that all information about dynamic dependence in behavior, which is particularly important in the political transition context stressing inertia and persistence, is lost. Balanced panel data like the ones that we are mainly relying on here are required to identify the dependence between past and current behavior by tracking subjects (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) . Our contribution in this regard, that is, to the "persistent gap" hypothesis, lies in combining the approved empirical strategy by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) with the idea of Rainer and Siedler (2009) to examine whether the democratic experience of East Germans leads to an erosion of distrust. Beyond that, we analyze how inert this process actually is in translating into enhanced cooperativeness. Another fundamental notion that is sometimes seen as prerequisite for trust and altruistic cooperation is fairness. At the individual level, it has for example been shown that sel…sh or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003) . By now, there are only very few studies that empirically study fairness at the societal level (see, e.g., Zak and Fakhar 2005) . To our knowledge, none of them analyzes the notion of fairness in the context of the German uni…cation process.
We add to this literature (i) by examining the East-West trust gradient for the …rst time using panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which allows accounting for intra-personal correlation over time, (ii) by analyzing the e¤ects on individuals' risk attitudes and their persistence as well as (iii) by studying the di¤erences in the perception of others being fair and helpful and their persistence over time. Some basic hypotheses are derived from a model of German uni…cation that incorporates individual responses both to incentives and to values inherited from earlier generations as recently suggested by Tabellini (2008a) .
Our results indicate that despite almost twenty years of uni…cation, East Germans show a lower level of social trust, which is only slowly converging to the West German level in the second decade of the uni…cation process. This …nding is in line with predictions from our uni…cation extension of Tabellini (2008a) , and it holds controlling for a wide range of socio-demographic and contextual characteristics as well as across various estimation approaches. In contrast, West Germans show a quantitatively small downward tendency in terms of broadly measured social trust amounting to about one …fth of the signi…cant East-West gap in the second decade of the uni…cation process. With regard to testing the model synthesizing incentives and inherited value systems, these results lend support to the passing of cultural traits across generations and for cooperation being sustained by values and reputation. Extrapolating our results, full convergence in social trust will take approximately one more decade. For fairness and cooperativeness, we …nd (yet) no statistically signi…cant trajectory of convergence to extrapolate.
Contrary to common belief, we also …nd East Germans to have been more risk loving than their West German counterparts at the beginning of the last decade which again holds for an ample range of robustness checks. In contrast to trust, fairness, and cooperativeness, however, risk attitudes clearly fully converged in the "Two Germanies" to the more risk averse attitude prevalent among West German individuals.
Finally, we use a counterfactual placebo e¤ects strategy to show that our …ndings are not resulting from di¤erences in mentality or local environments but are a product from socialization due to the Communist system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an account of the historical background and summarizes the existing literature on trust and cooperation, fairness and value systems and how these notions relate to a political system in place.
The …nal part of Section 2 presents our German uni…cation extension of the model by Tabellini (2008a) . Section 3 analogously reviews the literature and some theoretical considerations on risk taking in di¤erent political systems and in times of transition.
Empirical evidence is reported and discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Rainer and Siedler (2009, pp. 251-252) quantify the societal in…ltration and climate of mistrust in the following way referring to Koehler (1999) as central source for
…gures: "The Stasi kept …les on an estimated six million people, and built up a network of civilian informants ('uno¢cial collaborators'), who monitored politically incorrect behavior among other citizens. By 1995, 174,000 East Germans had been identi…ed as uno¢cial collaborators. This amounts to 2.5 percent of the total population and constitutes one of the highest penetrations of any society by a security apparatus. In fact, the ratio of 'watchers' to 'watched' was even higher than (i.e. roughly 90-times) that of the Soviet Union under communism." Other sources document an even higher penetration of society with a total of 600,000 MfS collaborators, implying on average, at least, one
Stasi collaborator in every random sample of 50 citizens (Citizens' Committee 2010).
The GDR system habitually imposed unfair moral choices: for example, denounce your neighbor or colleague, or your child will never go to university. It preached altruism but ingrained sel…shness. Obviously, in the words of Tabellini (2008b, p. 909) there is a his-tory of political abuse and exploitation from which citizens of the former GDR su¤ered, possibly echoing to the present day. The central open question therefore is whether or by how much after two decades, i.e., after one generation having grown up in a free and law-governed society, restoration of public-spiritedness, decency, and trust is completed.
Before setting up a model of trust and cooperation in the context of German uni…ca-tion, we will brie ‡y sketch the existing literature as it relates to the relationship between political system and the notions of social trust, fairness, and scope of cooperation.
Political system and social trust
In a recent paper, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) document the high persistency of mistrust among black Africans whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade.
To capture a causal e¤ect the authors use historic proximity of ancestors to the coast of the Indian ocean and the Paci…c ocean to instrument slave trade intensity. They …nd that even 100 years after the end of the slave trade period, the system left its traces in terms of an eroded level of social trust. Of course, we would not expect such a secular persistency of mistrust in the aftermath of the GDR system given that the slave trade period lasted for about four centuries, depriving colored individuals from basically all human rights, while the repressive surveillance-based system of the GDR existed for four decades.
When it comes to comparing West and East German individuals, we would rather expect similar or even more pronounced evidence of a gap in social trust as reported in Tabellini (2008b) who …nds that trust of second-generation U.S. citizens is higher if they came from countries that over a century ago had the better political institutions.
Based on data from repeated cross-sections Rainer and Siedler (2009) …nd some …rst indications for this hypothesis to hold for the …rst decade after Germany's uni…cation, that is, for the early transition period of East Germany from a communist regime to a market-based democracy. However, to measure the (inherited) persistency of mistrust and a potential convergence of trust levels in the post-transition period, the use of panel data is a necessity. It shoud be noted that our data also allow us to control for individual labor market experiences in an e¤ort to isolate socialization e¤ects from e¤ects induced by su¤ering from dramatic labor market shocks and high levels of economic insecurity.
2.2 Political system, fairness and value systems Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) argue that fairness is prior to trust inasmuch as social trust might be seen as the outcome of a (repeated) experience of fairness and cooperativeness.
One political system generates behavior of repeated fairness and cooperation. This behavior "breeds" trustworthiness which, in turn, leads to mutually trusting individuals.
Another political system might directly impair society and "infect" it through governmentally induced non-trustworthy (individual) behavior, leading to mutually mistrusting individuals. This literature questions the dominant role and universality of self-interest and the implication that welfare enhancing cooperation is doomed to fail unless well de…ned small groups interact inde…nitely (Gächter et al. 2010) . See also Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a recent survey of the related theoretical literature. Yet there are only a few studies that empirically study fairness at the societal level (see, e.g., Zak and Fakhar 2005) . To our knowledge, none of them analyzes the notion of fairness in the context of German uni…cation.
A political system, in particular, in its polar form of a collectivist (GDR) or individualist (FRG) society, shapes through, among others, markets and economic institutions the cultural and socio-economic background of a society (Greif 1994 , Bowles 1998 ). Fairness as a dominant behavioral force is found to be determined by this type of background (Guiso et al. 2006 , Fernández 2007 , Tabellini 2008b ). The socio-economic background of a society in turn is identi…ed in the literature as those sets of beliefs and values that the majority of people in a society hold and that get "transmitted fairly unchanged from generation to generation" (Guiso et al. 2006, p. 23) . Since the "evolution of value systems is determined by initial and possibly random historical circumstances" (Tabellini 2008a, p. 909) and since the division of Germany in terms of actual borders implied quite some random element as documented, for example, in Redding and Sturm (2007) , the German uni…cation process is a most interesting historical incidence with quasi-experimental character to study in this context.
Theoretical model of trust and cooperation
Recently, Tabellini (2008a) proposed a model of trust and cooperation that discriminates two types of players. Players k = 0; 1 di¤er in the rate at which a warm glow e¤ect (Andreoni 1990) willing to cooperate the higher is the probability that their partner will also cooperate.
With regard to a communist system, this strategic complementarity can be interpreted in the following way: If a system succeeds in raising the number of individuals 1 n who are true to its principles, it simultaneously fosters the collectivistic attitude of people who are already blindly loyal to the system. A decreasing cooperativeness with increasing 1 n generally is a central testable implication: The share of not-trustworthy individuals 1 n in a society can be exogenously increased by a repressive political regime. In the context of Germany's division, this clearly was the case in the GDR, due to every day life in…ltrating activities of Stasi (secret state's police) collaborators and the hiring and networking of civilian informants.
Endogenizing n is achieved by modeling how parents rationally choose what values to transmit to their children dependent on economic incentives as well as other features of the environment. Whether a given individual is of type k = 0 or 1 is due to either "nature or nurture," where the latter is determined by the external environment and/or the parental education e¤ort. Parents are altruistic and care about the utility of their o¤spring, but evaluate their kids' expected welfare with their own preferences. This assumption of "imperfect empathy" (Tabellini 2008a, p. 916) implies that some parents devote e¤ort to try and shape the values of their children to resemble their own. Consider an in…nite economy, where agents live two periods. In the …rst period, they get educated by their parents. After completion of education, agents become themselves players in the game described above. In the second period, each individual is the parent of a single kid and the parent's only activity is to educate the respective o¤spring. Parental education increases the probability that the kid becomes trustworthy ( k = 1 ), but is costly for the parent. Educational e¤ort f is chosen by each parent before observing a kid's type of value system. The probability of having a trustworthy kid does not depend on the parent's type. The impact of "nature and nurture" is denoted by and f , respectively.
Given e¤ort f 0, the kid turns out to be trustworthy ( k = 1 ) with probability + f , and unreliable ( k = 0 ) with probability 1 ( + f ), where 1 > > 0.
The fraction of trustworthy players in each period, n t , evolves endogenously over time according to the following fundamental law of motion
where f t now exclusively denotes e¤ort by a trustworthy parent. If parents exert no e¤ort, the average fraction of trustworthy kids in the population equals . In period t, the fraction of trustworthy parents n t 1 exerts educational e¤ort f t , which in turn increases the fraction of trustworthy kids in the population by n t 1 f t on average. The parents' optimal choice of educational e¤ort implies f t > 0. Recalling + f t is denoting a probability, it follows that 1 f t . Furthermore, f t can be shown to be a known functionf t = F (Y certain inertia: A high starting level of trustworthiness in a society (n 0 ) can be sustained just as well as a low starting level for several generations. The educational game behind is supermodular (Tabellini 2008a, pp. 921-922) . Let an equilibrium vector be given by (Y 1 t ; n t ). As Y 1 t increases, trustworthy parents are induced to put more e¤ort into changing their kid's values due to the second strategic complementarity in the model. Hence, n t is an increasing function both in Y 1 t and n t 1 , i.e., n t = N (Y 1 t ; n t 1 ) is also increasing in Y 1 t . Setting n t = n t 1 = n s , a steady state is given by
We can derive the following central testable implications that we will elaborate in more detail in the context of German uni…cation:
Individuals are more willing to cooperate the higher is the probability that their partner will also cooperate. The scope of cooperation Y 1 t is increasing in n t and decreasing in (1 n t ), that is, in the share of trustworthy and not-trustworthy individuals, respectively (…rst strategic complementarity).
If the …rst implication is found to hold, the equilibrium asymptotically reaches a steady state (Y 1 ; n ).
If the …rst two implications are found to hold, then there is an adjustment to the steady state, during which Y 1 t and n t move in the same direction. The adjustment is not abrupt. There is inertia in n. It takes > 1 generation until a new steady state is reached (second strategic complementarity).
Consider two societies, East (E) and West (W ), that developed a scope of cooperation over several decades independently of each other according to the model skteched above,
The respective steady states are depicted as the two points of intersection in Figure 1 . Obviously and intuitively, n W > n E , due to the above discussed repressive nature of the GDR (denoted by superscript E), a police state, where citizens were not only surveilled and scrutinized but also controlled by the underlings of the regime recruited from fellow citizens. That is, the share of trustworthy persons in W is higher than the one in society E. Next, consider fundamental equation (1) for a consecutive sequence of periods (i.e., generations), where reuni…cation happens to take place in t, 2 (0; 1), 1 f due to the fact that + f represents a probability, I j for j = W; E denotes inhabitants in East and West, and R denotes re-uni…ed Germany:
Clearly, n E t 1 , i.e., the share of trustworthy individuals in the former GDR has a sustained impact on the share of trustworthy individuals even several generations after reuni…cation.
However, this impact has a decaying weight due to f < 1. In the period of reuni…cation, the East German society moves out of its original steady state due to the exogenous decrease in the overall fraction of not-trustworthy fellow citizens. This induces a second round e¤ect as East German parents now expect other East German parents to put more e¤ort into educating a trustworthy o¤spring. They anticipate that due to this e¤ect the fraction of trustworthy players will further increase and they realize that this will expand the scope of cooperation Y 1E t . By increasing, both n E and Y 1E move in the same direction towards the West German steady state levels
. This is shown in Figure 1 . Whether the transition to the new steady state is smooth or perturbed, as suggested, for example, in Süssmuth et al. (2010) , is unclear as indicated by the dashed hand, West Germans are themselves separately matched to each other. After uni…cation, the two separate Hotelling's circles merge into one and individuals -independently of being of East or West background-get randomly matched.
line arrows. If we apply the model symmetrically to West German parents and kids and follow the same argumentation as above with opposite signs, a self-reinforcing downward spiral is triggered because of the second strategic complementarity. 3 Risking: literature and theoretical considerations
Political system and risk attitude
Similar to trust that is found to be -if at all-poorly explained by the self-interestapproach (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003) , risk aversion at the societal level is not a simple matter of rationality but rather a matter of identity. But what is it that makes a society risk averse going beyond the slogan of a country being a "soft power" that is risk averse regarding only internal concerns? The answer given by Laidi (2010) is that the evolution of a general notion of risk aversion at the societal level requires a democratic experience and a system where public deliberation plays a crucial role in evaluating risk. In analogy to the First Amendment, freedom of opinion in the FRG is guaranteed in Article 5 of its Basic Law (Grundgesetz ), which comprises freedom of speech and freedom of press. It explicitly interdicts censorship. 5 In contrast, the GDR witnessed a constitution that successively eroded the freedom of opinion from its …rst version of 1949 to its proceeding versions of 1968 and 1974, which o¢cially set the state in its Article I under the leadership of its one and only party, the Marxist-Leninist party (SED). It cleared the way for all sorts of uncritical propaganda. Actually, before the "Monday Demonstrations" of the late 1980s that initiated the collapse of the GDR, debates of internal and external concerns of society existed only in the scattered and merely existent underground but not in the public sphere. Another potential argument for a relatively higher risk a¢nity among East Germans lies in the process of self-liberalization itself: Given the omni-present threat of the system, a peaceful self-liberalization required former GDR citizens to show a willingness to take risk above normal -on both sides, that is, among protesters as well as among subjects working for the system (not to resort to squeezing the trigger). 6 Convergence to a lower level prevalent among West German individuals might, at least to some extent, re ‡ect a corresponding adjustment of risk attitudes back to normal.
A perspective that is at …rst sight at odds with the above line of argumentation can be found in a recent and rather macroeconomic strand of literature that is concerned with …-nancial risk taking and the development of respective attitudes. It comes up with another reasoning regarding the nexus of personal or collective experience and risk attitude. For example, it suggests that individuals who had an experience of a large macroeconomic shock like the Great Depression show a long-lasting e¤ect on their attitudes towards risk due to this experience ("depression babies"). An overview of this literature is given in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) . According to this literature, it is in particular personal …nancial risk experience that shapes one's preferences towards risk. Given that planned economies in general failed to attenuate macroeconomic shocks and showed similar business cycle patterns as market economies (Hillinger 1992) , we would expect no substantial di¤erence in risk attitude. However, we should keep in mind that macroeconomic shocks were experienced quite di¤erently in the two systems. The GDR's collectivist social planner's state, for example, virtually guaranteed full employment, making it unnecessary for citizens to insure against unemployment. In this context, insurance through free capital market instruments, represented by a vast diversity of stock market vehicles, can be seen as an experience good or service in the sense of Nelson (1970) . Interpreting (…nancial) risk aversion in this way, we would also expect former GDR citizens to be characterized by a relatively lower level of risk aversion compared to West German individuals whose attitude evolved over decades of repeated experience with capital market instruments needed for insuring against macroeconomic shocks. Yet, this line of reasoning is restricted to the …nancial aspect of risk aversion and it does not directly apply to a more general notion of risk attitude.
Transition and risk attitude
On theoretical grounds, the study on the association of relative income and life satisfaction by Easterlin and Plagnol (2008) Friedman and Savage (1948) , Gregory (1980), and Rosenthal (2004) , this development of relative incomes can imply a reduction in the willingness to take risk due to positional concerns with regard to other societal groups for East Germans.
The argument is based on the idea that an individual's attitude to risk is determined by the relative position of that individual in the income distribution of a society rather than by her absolute net worth. Attainment and assurance of a particular position generates an additional gain in utility through status and, hence, an incentive to take risk. If this lead, in a "pecking order" sense (see, e.g., Becker et al. 2005) , is of permanent rather than transitory nature, lasting for more than a decade as documeted in Easterlin and Plagnol (2008) , this could clearly lower the incentive to take risk. It is noteworthy that this group of strangers usually refers not only to individuals who are not socially connected to the respondent but also comprises foreign nationals.
Perceived fairness in the society is surveyed by "Do you believe that most people ..." (C) "would exploit you if they had the opportunity" or (D) "would attempt to be fair towards you?". Our -again binary-fairness variable equals one if the respondent approves the latter statement.
Similarly, the binary "people are cooperative" indicator is generated from the responses to "Would you say that for most of the time, people ..." given by (E) "attempt to be 7 There is also a third item in the survey as possible answer a question that reads "Nowadays one cannot rely on anyone." As we consider this item to be a rather extreme "black or white" item, additionally requiring respondents to take a rather fuzzy backward looking perspective, we do not consider this item in the following. 8 Detailed results from ordered probit estimates are available on request from the authors.
helpful?" or (F) "only act in their own interests?". Approving the …rst statement induces value one in our variable.
Individuals' risk attitudes were …rst measured in 2004, with a general risk attitude item as well as context-speci…c risk attitudes, such as risk-taking in …nancial matters, in sports, or in health, and another risk measure derived from a hypothetical lottery scenario. To be able to examine the development over time, we however use the general risk attitude scale since it is only this indicator that is re-measured in 2008. 9 The questions in both waves of the survey read "Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? ;" the scale of responses runs from 0 "risk averse" to 10 "fully prepared to take risks." We employ least squares estimation for this variable as, again, results from ordered probit estimations are not substantially di¤erent from the ones we present below. Our baseline speci…cations are linear probability models accounting for random e¤ects (RE-LPM) of the following form
where y = (trust j fairness j cooperativeness j risk), and x denotes covariates comprising the socio-demographic characteristics sex, age (speci…ed as a cubic function), educational attainment, current employment status, employment history (yrs. of full-time/part-time employment or unemployment), (log of ) net household income, marital status, number of children, health status, and -in order to account for childhood and teenage circumstances -parental education, parental religion, the size of the place the respondent lived at until the age of 15, and further whether he or she still lives in his or her childhood hometown.
Moreover, we capture intra-German variation of individuals' environment by including the following contextual characteristics at the federal state level: Gini coe¢cient, unemployment rate, GDP p.c., 10 rate of solved crime cases, expenditure for education, and 9 In their experimentally validated study of individual risk attitudes based on SOEP data, Dohmen et al. (2011) document a substantial, and signi…cant positive correlation between measures of context-speci…c and general risk attitude. 10 Both the economic environment indicators and particularly the individual's own employment history will to some extent capture the e¤ects of East Germany's economic downswing after the fall of the wall. They are required in an e¤ort to disentangle the e¤ect of Communism from the experience of immediate post-uni…cation years that were characterized by dramatic proportion of foreigners. Obviously, coe¢cient measures the observed di¤erence be- Table 1a reports our RE-LPM estimates for the two trust items as described in Section 4.1. For all speci…cations [1] to [4] , we estimate a statistically signi…cant negative coe¢cient for individuals who experienced the GDR system (East German), suggesting a still existent relatively lower level of trust prevalent among this group of individuals in the second decade of the uni…cation process. In the even speci…cations [2] and [4] , we also consider a potential e¤ect from moving to West Germany after reuni…cation. We expect these respondents to show a relatively higher level of trust compared to individuals who did not move to the West as it is plausible to assume that either trust fosters migration or migrating forces to trust. The estimates reported in Table 1 support this hypothesis for the "general trust" item but not for trust towards strangers. 11 Yet, in terms of size, an East-West gap remains and increases throughout, meaning that the East-West di¤erentials are even larger for those East Germans who did not migrate after reuni…cation.
Findings and discussion

Trust items
structural change and shocks in the East German labor market. 11 As noted earlier the statistical insigni…cance of the "Moved West" coe¢cient in the assessment of the trustworthiness of strangers might be the product of bias due to the fact that the group of "strangers" is not clearly de…ned and, among others, also comprises foreign nationals.
The central coe¢cient estimate to assess East-West convergence as described by the model outlined in the preceding section is the interaction term of East German background and the ending year of our analysis 2008 (EGerman*08). As can be seen from estimates of speci…cation [2] to [4] in Table 1 , there is convergence for the item capturing the assessment of the overall trustworthiness of other people (Can trust people) and perceived trustworthiness of strangers (Careful with strangers). All other things being equal, the estimates of speci…cation [2] Estimated coe¢cients of speci…cations [3] and [4] imply that, other things being equal, full convergence in perceived trustworthiness of strangers is reached by 2009, that is, 20 years after reuni…cation.
Another important prediction of the Tabellini (2008a) model applied to German uni…cation is that not only East Germans become more trusting and trustworthy but also that the opposite should apply to West Germans, though to a quantitatively lesser extent ( Figure 3 ). To study this implication, we estimate a year 2008 e¤ect for our 2003/2008 pool subsampling only West German subjects living in West Germany (Table 1b) . Indeed, we …nd for the more general …rst trust item (Can trust people) a signi…cant downward tendency that corresponds to approximately half of the estimated gap between East and West German individuals (Table 1a, 1b).
In sum, regression results of our analysis of di¤erent trust items con…rm that individuals who experienced the GDR system still show a relatively higher level of social distrust and scepticism. We also …nd that it is important to account for East-West migration in the case of the more general trust measure.
Although pointing in the same direction, our estimates suggest to carefully distinguish between di¤erent dimensions of perceived trustworthiness: The measure for the overall trustworthiness of other people will possibly converge some thirty years or one generation after reuni…cation, while the convergence in perceived trustworthiness of strangers is estimated to be reached in recent years, that is, less than one generation after reuni…cation. Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses."Careful with strangers" is a binary variable recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust. Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses. "Careful with strangers" is a binary variable recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust; state-level controls are dropped due to lack of variation.
As for the theoretical predictions, our estimates employing the most general measure of trust as dependent variable con…rm all testable implications of the model outlined in Section 2.3.
Intergenerational transmisison of trust
This subsection is concerned with a central implication of both our interpretation of the precedingly presented estimates and our model. Following the logic of Tabellini (2008b) adapted to the East German setting, we suggested that present di¤erences are rooted in experiences of (dis)trust which date back to the days of the GDR and have been transmitted from one generation to the next to the extent that children learn behavioral patterns from their kin and others with whom they are in close contact, such as teachers (Guiso et al. 2006) . In the estimates reported in Table 2 , we thus merged trust item A ("on the whole one can trust people") answers of an individual with the corresponding responses of her mother and father. This reduces our sample size by one digit. Obviously, there is a substantial East-West di¤erence also found for this subsample. Table 3a reports RE-LPM estimates employing as dependent variables our measures of perceived fairness and cooperativeness as well as of individual risk attitude. As can be seen immediately from the …rst line of coe¢cient estimates in Table 3a , East German individuals report lower levels of perceived fairness and cooperativeness, but are relatively more inclined to take risks. 13 This gap is statistically close to but not signi…cant at conventional levels for the fairness item. It might be due to a statistically signi…cant decline of perceived fairness observed among West Germans living in West Germany (Table 3b ). In the case of cooperativeness, the gap is estimated as relatively profound if we control for moves to the West. An interpretation of this …nding is that movers might have assessed cooperativeness higher than individuals who stayed in East Germany after the fall of the wall, in particular, against the backdrop of no discernible downard tendency in cooperativeness in the Westeners sample (Table 3b) . Again, this is in line with the 12 Note, a detailed analysis of trust convergence using this child-parent-merging strategy and combining the two SOEP waves 2003 and 2008 is beyond the scope of the present study. It is possible, although attrition then further reduces the sample size per wave. Furthermore note that our …ndings are qualitatively unaltered when resorting to an ordered Probit model. Both pooled waves and ordered Probit estimates are available on request from the authors. 13 Recently, Bonin et al. (2009) …nd some …rst indications for the latter result as a "side product" of their study on native-migrant di¤erences in risk attitudes using German data. learning process as outlined in the model above. Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses. "Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary variables representing whether the respondent perceives others to act fair or to be helpful. Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses. "Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary variables representing whether the respondent perceives others to act fair or to be helpful; state-level controls dropped due to lack of variation.
Another striking result is that we …nd no signi…cant East-West convergence of either perceived fairness or cooperativeness between 2003 and 2008, while risk attitudes fully converged before the end of the second decade after reuni…cation. The latter …nding is straightforwardly explained by the learning process and/or lowered positional concerns e¤ect described in Section 3.1 and 3.2. In fact, it is suggestive for a relatively short period of learning and adjustment to a more risk averse attitude taking the time of about 1.5 to 2-times the length of an average business cycle. As can be seen from Table   3b there is a statistically signi…cant downward tendency with regard to perceived fairness among West Germans that is in terms of size almost two thirds of the size of the gap in fairness perception that exists up to 2008 between West and East German subjects. This …nding of limited convergence 14 in fairness and cooperativeness can be reconciled with the theoretical model outlined in Section 2.3. However, it requires the relatively strong assumption of a low elasticity with which the upper bound of the scope of cooperation (Y 1 ) reacts to an increase of trust, i.e. to an increase in the number of trustworthy individuals in society. Figure 3 makes the point. As in Figure 1 and 2, the steeper of the two respectively intersecting functions represents Y 1 , while the ‡atter one shows N .
If cooperativeness reacts only weakly to an increase in trust, Y 1 is fairly steep. As trust increases, the initial (bold lines) East German steady state (E 0 ) relocates as the number of trustworthy individuals n increases exogenously after reuni…cation. The shift along the ordinate is further ampli…ed by the second strategic externality due to parents adjusting values and passing them to their o¤spring. A new steady state level of trust for reuni…ed Germany is reached (n R ). Although there is a profound convergence along the ordinate, the e¤ect on cooperativeness is small given a low elasticity with which Y 1 reacts to an increase in n. As a result, there is no unique steady state in the level of cooperativeness for the re-united population, i.e., Y
even though this explains both of our empirical …ndings, i.e. persistence in the East-West cooperativeness gap and a simultaneous convergence in trust, it rests on a rather special case.
Age e¤ects
To analyze in more detail whether the duration of living in the former repressive East
German system has left an imprint on our social and risk attitude measures for easterners, we run additional regressions including terms that interact the East German Background with age. Results for these estimates are shown in Table 4 .
Overall, we do not …nd evidence for an association between age (or cohort) interacted with the East dummy and general social trust or individuals' perceived fairness and cooperativeness. 15 The picture is di¤erent for risk attitudes as dependent. First, it is noteworthy that overall we …nd younger individuals to have been slightly more risk loving than older ones (slope of age without interaction). Secondly, however, in the case of easterners, risk willingness profoundly increases with age, i.e. with time spent in the, at least, economically less risky and widely without public deliberation environment of the GDR. 15 Fairly similar results are obtained if we consider cohorts instead of age. Corresponding estimates are available on request from the authors. 24,160; 26,332 Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses; Trust 1: "Can trust people", Trust 2: "Careful with strangers"; the latter has been recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust; "Fairness" and "Cooperate" are binary variables representing whether respondents perceive others to act fair or to be helpful.
Sensitivity analysis: Placebo e¤ects
One may be concerned that our …ndings are driven by di¤erences in mentality or local environments rather than resultant from socialization in the Communist system. To demonstrate that this is not the case, we counterfactually construct a Southern part of Germany consisting of the two West German federal states (Alte Länder) Bavaria and Baden Württemberg. We compare this reference group of federal states in a hypothetical empirical convergence model of the form shown in eq. (4) with a series of Northern Alte Länder, i.e., Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lower Saxony, corresponding in terms of sample size roughly to our East German data. 16 As can be seen from estimates in Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; dependent variables de…nitions as in Table 3 ; North Germany reference group: Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony; South Germany reference states: Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg
Conclusion
On November 9th 1989, when a more or less unintentional East German government announcement sent a surge of people westwards, ultimately bringing the wall down, a new chapter in German history began. For decades o¢cial propaganda in the GDR had tried to discredit the "exploitative" market-based economy and "rapacious" society of the FRG. The once omnipresent fear of denouncement and detainment seemingly ceased over night. Against this background, we addressed the question whether and if so by how much after 20 years of reuni…cation restoration of social trust is completed, fairness and a Bavarian in particular, is usually thought to be cheerful, with a good sense of humour, pious, and wearing traditional clothing (such as Lederhosen and Dirndl). To some extent, this gradient can be traced back historically inasmuch as large parts of the areas of todays Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria were not part of the Prussian Empire.
and cooperativeness restored, and attitudes towards risk converged. While we …nd that risk attitudes fully converged in the second decade of reuni…cation, it will take at least one generation for social trust and possibly much longer for perceived cooperativeness to converge. The implied trajectories of our estimates are shown to be in line with predictions from a model that incorporates individual responses both to incentives and to values inherited from earlier generations as recently suggested by Tabellini (2008a) . This is a most remarkable result as it identi…es the passing of cultural traits and values as a central channel of explanation for limited social convergence and long lasting e¤ects from historic events in the context of German division and uni…cation. It complements and to some extent also challenges other routes of explanation based on network externalities and scale e¤ects (e.g. Uhlig 2006 ) that require the assumption of persistence in their driving forces in order to generate discrepancies that last for several generations. Similarly, after more than two decades of an ongoing reuni…cation process it seems not justi…ed to argue that it is the institutional shock (as, for example, in Acemoglu et al. 2001 Acemoglu et al. , 2002 Acemoglu et al. , 2005 ) that accounts for the limited convergence we observe for social trust as well as for individuals' perceptions of others acting fair or being cooperative. 
